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Foreword  
Consumer Focus is the statutory consumer champion for England, Wales, Scotland 
and (for postal consumers) Northern Ireland. We operate across the whole of the 
economy, persuading businesses, public services and policy makers to put 
consumers at the heart of what they do.  
We have been working on copyright related issues for many years through our 
predecessor organisation, the National Consumer Council. We want to see a digital 
economy characterised by competitive, dynamic and innovative markets to which 
consumers have meaningful access and in which they are empowered to make 
informed choices. We want to see a copyright system that supports this by striking a 
fair balance between creators, copyright owners and consumers. 
We commissioned this independent review of the existing economic literature on the 
economic impact of consumer copyright exceptions. The review focused on copyright 
exceptions for consumers for activities such as time-shifting, format-shifting, back-up 
copies, user-generated content and ‘private’ or ‘domestic’ copying and sharing of 
copyrighted work.  
The review did not consider illegal file-sharing or ‘piracy’ issues.  
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Mark Rogers, RIP 
Mark Rogers died following a long illness in July 2011. Mark’s research 
interests spanned intellectual property, economic growth, productivity and 
innovation. Mark in particular contributed to the study of copyright, which is a 
neglected area in intellectual property economics.  
This literature review and Mark’s economic analysis have substantially shaped 
Consumer Focus’ policy position on copyright exceptions, and we are grateful 
to have had the opportunity to work with Mark. 
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Executive summary 
Advances in the technology available to consumers have fundamentally 
altered the relationship between authors, rights-holders and consumers with 
regard to copyrighted creative works. The copyright system in the UK is 
undergoing a gradual process of reform to reflect this new reality.  
In 2006, Andrew Gowers, a former editor of the Financial Times, presented a 
report into the state of intellectual property in the UK. Among his policy 
recommendations were three proposed changes to the copyright exceptions 
system which alter the way in which consumers can interact with copyrighted 
works. Gowers proposed introducing copyright exceptions for: 
• Format-shifting, for instance the transfer of a piece of music from 
a CD to an MP3 player.    
• Parody, caricature and pastiche. 
• Creative, transformative or derivative works. In our context, this 
definition includes user-generated content.   
Our review examines the existing literature on the possible economic effects 
of these proposed changes to the copyright exceptions system, specifically 
whether the introduction of these proposed changes would cause economic 
damage to rights-holders. Whilst the economic issues surrounding copyright 
infringement via file-sharing and commercial ‘mash-ups’ are interesting and 
important, our review is focused solely on copyright exceptions as they relate 
to non-commercial, consumer activities.   
Investigating potential economic damage to rights-holders requires an 
analysis of how consumer copyright exception could affect the demand for the 
original creative work. The processes via which consumer copyright 
exceptions influence the demand curve for original creative work can be 
complicated. This said, a standard analysis of the demand for creative works 
must assume that consumers incorporate the benefit of copyright exceptions 
into their demand. A consumer’s decision to purchase is based on the benefits 
of the product, including – in the case of creative work – the value of any 
copyright exception. In this sense, it can be argued that a creator 
automatically extracts value from copyright exceptions, since these directly 
influence the demand for the original creative work.  
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In our review, the two most commonly cited ‘economic’ studies into the effects 
of Private Copying Remuneration (PCR) systems – Econlaw (2007) and 
Nathan Associates (2006) – do not provide any useful evidence that 
consumer copyright exceptions cause economic damage to rights-holders, or 
that a copyright levy is justified on these grounds. 
• The Econlaw study incorrectly equates economic damage with 
consumer value and does not contain a formal discussion of the 
demand for copyrighted works. 
• The Nathan Associates study does not make a necessary 
distinction between ‘damage to consumers and producers’ and 
‘damage to society as a whole’. It likely overstates the economic 
damage caused by PCR. It also uses estimates for demand 
elasticities that do not come from formal economic analysis.  
The economic evidence that format-shifting, parody and user-generated 
content cause any kind of economic damage to rights-holders simply does not 
exist. Arguments that support tighter copyright law, or support PCR systems, 
tend to confuse economic damage with consumer value. Any future analysis 
on this issue needs to investigate the conditions under which the proposed 
consumer copyright exceptions would have any impact on demand for 
creative work.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years the interest in copyright has grown substantially as new 
technologies have changed the way creative work is produced, sold and 
consumed in our society. These changes have generated shock waves that 
have affected creators, firms, policymakers, the legal system and, last but not 
least, consumers. In particular, the new digital technologies have given rise to 
new opportunities and threats across the economic and social system. The 
copyright system, which has its origins in the Statute of Anne 1710 and was 
developed substantially in the 19th century, has come under intense pressure. 
The ability to copy and disseminate others’ creative work at very low cost has 
given rise to the issues of illegal file sharing and ‘piracy’. New consumer 
electronic devices have given consumers the ability to adapt and create new 
work, known as user-generated content.  
All of these changes have given rise to new issues concerning policy. In the 
UK the Gowers Review in 2006 put forward 54 recommendations concerned 
with developing the existing legal and policy framework for intellectual 
property rights, with a strong focus on copyright. Some of these 
recommendations concerned copyright exceptions. Within these a small 
number are directly relevant to consumers: format-shifting, parody and user-
generated content.  
Consumer Focus commissioned us to provide an independent review of the 
existing economic literature on these issues. The review was to focus on 
copyright exceptions for consumers for activities such as time-shifting, format-
shifting, back-up copies, user-generated content and ‘private’ or ‘domestic’ 
copying and sharing of copyrighted work. The review should not focus on file-
sharing. The last sentence is very important. This review is not intended to 
consider illegal file-sharing or ‘piracy’ issues. It was also agreed that the 
review should focus on studies that were published after 2004 and also any 
UK evidence. 
The structure of this report is as follows. The remainder of this section 
provides some background on why intellectual property generates difficult 
issues within economics.  
Section 2 considers copyright exceptions, reviewing the legal issues and then 
linking these with the current debates and the Gowers report. A key issue in 
these debates is whether consumer-related copyright exceptions cause 
‘economic damage’ to creators, or more specifically the firms that produce and 
distribute creative work.  
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Section 3 seeks to determine how one should think about ‘economic damage’ 
and the parallel issue of ‘consumer value’.  
Section 4 looks at the existing literature that provides formal empirical 
evidence on these issues, which we call the knowledge base. It turns out the 
knowledge base on these issues is unbelievably small: there is a void of any 
formal economic analysis. Section 5 clarifies the nature of this void and 
Section 6 concludes. 
1.1. Intellectual property and non-rivalry 
The key issue that distinguishes an analysis of copyright (and other forms of 
intellectual property) is that the products involved can be non-rival. This 
means that multiple consumers can consume, or use, the product at the same 
time. With a standard product – cars, food, clothes, etc – where a consumer 
gets sole use of the product, economic theory tells us that the price paid 
should reflect the marginal cost of producing the good. For non-rival goods, 
the price to an additional consumer should be low or zero, since the marginal 
cost is low or zero. Clearly, when a creator produces music, film, software or 
other copyrighted products, charging a low or zero price may not generate an 
economic return. Lack of an economic return may, in many cases, prevent the 
creation and distribution of the new work – a major loss to society.  
Hence, copyright protection is designed to balance out the need for creators 
to receive a return, and have an incentive to be creative, against the desire to 
have a low or zero price on non-rival products. This tension is evident across 
the many debates in copyright.1  
The balancing act is brought into sharp focus by the debate over making 
copies of copyrighted material. Making copies, especially in a digital age, can 
replicate the original work at very low cost. Copying can, therefore, allow 
greater access by consumers to the work at low cost (a benefit), but runs the 
risk of reducing returns to the creators (a direct loss to them and likely to 
reduce new creative work). The economic impact of copying has been of 
interest to economists for many years (see Liebowitz, 1985), but recent 
advances in technology have heightened concerns. There is a value to 
consumers in copying and trying to monetize all activities would create large 
transactions costs. Copyright therefore allows copying exceptions. These are 
part of a larger group of exceptions discussed in Section 2.  
1 For overviews of the economics of copyright see, for example, Towse et al (2008), Corrigan 
and Rogers (2005), Einhorn (2004) or Landes and Posner (2003). For discussions focussed 
on the economics of ‘fair dealing’ or ‘fair use’ see Boyer (2007) and Klein et al (2002).  
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2. Copyright exceptions 
When regarding copyright exceptions of any kind the argument turns on 
whether the situation can be described as a ‘copyright exception’ or a 
‘copyright limitation’. This is a very important point to understand. On a legal 
reading of the term ‘copyright exception’, consumers or other agents can use 
copyrighted material in specified ways without violating copyright. The 
particular usages fall outside the scope of the copyright. 
Copyright limitation works differently. The idea is that the natural scope of 
copyright includes any use of the copyrighted work. On this reading there are 
no legally permitted copyright exceptions for use of copyrighted material. Any 
of the acts we have termed copyright exceptions below (time-shifting, format-
shifting etc) would be construed as violations of copyright. In this scenario, the 
authorisation by the rights-holder for any of these acts demands 
compensation, regardless of any notional economic harm that results from the 
act. This is the position taken by many collecting societies, this for example 
from British Music Rights’ response to the 2006 EU Stakeholder consultation 
on Copyright Levies2: 
It is erroneous to consider the ‘fair compensation’ provided for in Article 
5(2)(b) of the Copyright Directive as direct compensation for economic 
harm. It is compensation for the rights-holders’ surrendering their 
exclusive right to authorise the act of private copying. Having said that, 
we would point out that whilst it is difficult to quantify the harm caused 
by private copying recent research shows that music on MP3 players 
mainly originates from private copying. (page 3) 
In this report we focus on the issue of ‘copyright exception’ and an analysis of 
the economic harm or damage that these may cause. As indicated above, 
those that argue for ‘copyright limitation’ are largely uninterested in economic 
analysis as it pertains to measuring economic damage and they prefer to 
argue that they should be able to extract the benefit of all the value derived 
from a copyrighted work. 
 
2 BMR Response to 2008 EU Stakeholder Consultation on Copyright Levies - Available at: 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/copyright_neighbouring/s
takeholder_consultation/british_music_rights/_EN_1.0_&a=d  
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2.1. What are we considering when we refer to copyright 
exceptions?  
Copyright itself exists to protect a work from being reproduced, distributed, 
communicated to the public, lent, rented out or publically performed without 
the permission of the owner. Without the permission of the rights-holder, such 
acts are illegal. There are a limited number of acts that fall under the umbrella 
of copyright exceptions (i.e. they may be performed without having to obtain 
the permission of the rights-holder).  
Currently, UK law states that acts for which a copyright exception exists 
include: 
• Non-commercial research and private study 
• Criticism, review and reporting current events 
• Teaching in education establishments  
• Not for profit public playing of recorded music  
• Helping visually impaired people 
• Time-shifting  
In addition, permission is not normally needed if a ‘less than substantial’ part 
of a copyrighted work is being used. What defines ‘less than substantial’ has 
been a matter for the courts to decide and has resulted in some decisions that 
may be regarded as not entirely consistent across different media. For 
instance, a US court ruled in 2005 that the sampling of 3 notes (less than 2 
seconds) of a guitar solo was copyright infringement3. In comparison, whilst 
there is no set proportion in UK law that constitutes ‘less than substantial’ 
when it comes to photocopying a copyrighted book, the ‘rule of thumb’ is one 
chapter or 5% of the total (whichever is less). 
The Gowers (2006) report lists two purposes for copyright exceptions. The 
first is the existence of transaction costs. For some usages of copyrighted 
material e.g. news reporting, it would be prohibitively expensive and time 
consuming to contact the rights-holder to clear the rights in each instance. 
The second is equity issues. Copying a text into Braille would be illegal 
without a copyright exception. Both of these reasons are dealt with under ‘fair 
dealing’ legislation. The UK-IPO website carries the following description of 
fair dealing: 
3 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). See also James 
Boyle’s discussion of the case in: Boyle (2008) pp. 149-150. 
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In certain circumstances, some works may be used if that use is 
considered to be 'fair dealing'. There is no strict definition of what this 
means but it has been interpreted by the courts on a number of 
occasions by looking at the economic impact on the copyright owner of 
the use. Where the economic impact is not significant, the use may 
count as fair dealing.4 
This is the crux of the issue we are addressing. Do the proposed additions to 
the list of copyright exceptions found in Gowers (format-shifting, parody and 
user-generated content), as applicable to consumers, have a significant or 
insignificant economic effect on rights-holders?  
UK law on copyright exceptions is bounded by the EU Information Society 
Directive. Recital 35 of the Directive 2001/29/EC states:  
[I]n cases where right-holders have already received payment in some 
other form, for instance as part of a licence fee, no specific or separate 
payment may be due.... In certain situations where the prejudice to the 
right-holder would be minimal, no obligation for payment may arise.5 
The argument put forward in the Gowers Report is that format-shifting is a 
reality, driven by changes in technology and consumer demand to be able to 
enjoy their music or other copyrighted material on a variety of different 
platforms. Further, by allowing a clearly defined and limited copyright 
exception for format-shifting, rights-holders could respond by including any 
economic cost of the right to copy could be included in the sale price.    
2.2. Why this literature review and why now? 
Amongst the many recommendations in the Gowers report, three are aimed at 
reforming UK and EU law with regard to consumer copyright exceptions. The 
recommendations cover format-shifting, parody and user-generated content. 
The following section states each of Gowers’ recommendations and then 
discusses the economic issues concerning them.  
 
4 http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/copy/c-other/c-exception/c-exception-review/c-exception-
fairdealing.htm 
5 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society – 
Official Journal L 167, 22/06/2001 P.0010 – 0019  
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Recommendation 8: Introduce a limited private copying exception 
by 2008 for format-shifting for works published after the date that 
the law comes into effect. There should be no accompanying 
levies for consumers. (Gowers, 2006) 
Format-shifting is the migration of a piece of copyrighted material from one 
platform to another. The classic example is the transferring of music from a 
CD to a computer hard drive or to an MP3 player. Format-shifting has been 
technically possible (and a reality) since the introduction of blank audio 
cassettes. Its current relevance is heightened due to the technological 
advances that have driven the marginal price of making copies towards zero 
and improved their quality. Today it is possible to ‘rip’ a music track from a CD 
and create an MP3 copy that is aurally indistinguishable to the vast majority of 
music fans.  
With the introduction of high-volume MP3 players, consumers can now play 
music anywhere and some have argued that the general trend of media use is 
shifting from being centred around particular mediums or platforms, to being 
centred around content, which can be viewed across platforms.6  
Format-shifting is often erroneously confused with the issue of ‘piracy’ or 
‘copyright infringement’ and it is important to make the distinction clear. 
Copyright infringement via peer-to-peer (P2P) networks is the act of posting 
copyrighted material online for others to download without permission from, or 
compensation to, the rights-holder. Much of the material that is available on 
P2P networks may have undergone an original format-shift from CD to an 
electronic format, but the illegality arises from the act of sharing with this 
private copy with other consumers, not from creating the copy in the first 
instance.7  
Much of the economic analysis of ‘piracy’, ‘copyright infringement’ and file-
sharing indicates that it can have both positive and negative impacts on sales 
of music. ‘Pirated’ music acts as an imperfect substitute for ‘legal’ music and 
reduces demand for CDs and legal digital music. However, research also 
indicates that file-sharing can act to increase the public exposure of some 
artists, particularly top-selling acts, increasing their record sales. Cause and 
effect, and the long-term impact of file-sharing on the incentives to produce 
artistic works are even harder to disentangle. 
6 See, for example, Bates (2009). 
7 This last statement is true in the US and in European countries where there is a copyright 
levy on blank media. At present in the UK, there is no copyright exception for private copying 
so the original format-shift is illegal as well. (Gowers, 2006. p. 62) 
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Recommendation 11: Propose that Directive 2001/29/EC be 
amended to allow for an exception for creative, transformative or 
derivative works, within the parameters of the Berne Three Step 
Test. (Gowers, 2006) 
The debate surrounding derivative or transformative works has been a lively 
one in recent years. Historically, an exception in US law allowed the Hip-Hop 
music genre to develop in the late 1970s and early 1980s via the sampling of 
older records, mainly soul and funk, to create whole new products and 
markets. The genre grew from being a local scene in New York in the 1970s 
to the biggest selling music genre worldwide by 1999. In the US, successive 
court cases have however have increased the restrictions on what can legally 
be sampled8, to the extent that sampling has now faded from the genre, or is 
reserved for established artists who can afford to license their samples. 
The current importance of the issue of user-generated content is due to 
advances in technology that have dramatically reduced the cost of artistic 
creation and the distribution of works. This has occurred to such an extent that 
work previously requiring a professional set-up can now be produced at home 
with computer equipment available to many households.  
Tools such as Youtube.com, Wikipedia.org and Flickr.com allow for the 
distribution of user-generated content to a wide audience. A specific sub-
genre of user-generated content can be regarded as derivative or 
transformative works.  
Examples given by the 2009 The Way Ahead report include: wedding videos 
containing music and photographs, remixes of pieces of music or ‘mash-ups’ 
of music, images and lyrics. 
The ease with which consumers can transform copyrighted works into new 
derivative or transformative works has given birth to a new genre of work 
referred to as the ‘Remix Culture’. This has been accompanied by an 
explosion in the quantity of derivative works available through the internet.  
 
 
8 For example: Grand Upright Music, Ltd v. Warner Bros. Records Inc., 780 F.Supp. 182 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). Rapper Biz Markie was sanctioned by a judge for sampling a section of 
Gilbert O’Sullivan’s song, ‘Alone Again’. 
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The problem from the perspectives of rights-holders is that of receiving 
remuneration for the use of their works. In a manner similar to that of format-
shifting, the argument runs that use of the original work in the derivative work 
harms the sales of the original, reduces the incentive for further creation or 
that rights-holders have an inherent claim on the consumer value derived from 
user-generated content. 
Recommendation 12: Create an exception to copyright for the 
purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche by 2008. (Gowers, 2006) 
There is currently no exception in UK law for the purpose of parody, caricature 
or pastiche. The economic issues involved with these types of transformative 
works are similar to those surrounding user-generated content. Three possible 
economic effects of a parody on an original work are: 
 
1. Lost sales due to confusion with the original.  
2. Increased sales due to new publicity and awareness of the original.  
3. Increased / lost sales due to reputational effects on the original.  
Given that parodical works self-consciously reference the original work, 
confusion is unlikely. This issue has been addressed in by the US Supreme 
Court in Campbell v. Acuff – Rose Music, Inc9. The court ruled that 2Live 
Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s ‘Pretty Woman’ did not impact the 
commercial success or viability of the original given its difference with original 
and its differing context and audience. 
What is certainly true is that parodical works can increase the sales of original 
works. In 2002, the Tony Christie song ‘Is This The Way to Amarillo’ was sung 
in a comedic style by two characters in a popular TV series. When the 1971 
recording was reissued in 2005 due to public demand, it was the biggest 
selling single of that year.  
The creation of an exception to copyright for the purposes of parody would not 
have the effect of legitimising reputational damage to the rights-holders of 
original work. Their moral rights to be identified as owners of the work and to 
use defamation laws to prevent offensive or damaging works would be 
unaffected. 
9 http://supreme.justia.com/us/510/569/case.html 
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3. Consumer value vs. economic damage 
The previous section outlined that a critical aspect in the legal debate 
surrounding copyright exceptions was whether the ‘economic impact [on the 
rights-holder] is not significant’ or the ‘prejudice to the right-holder would be 
minimal’. These statements refer to the potential loss in revenue or profits to 
the creators or agents that own the copyright.10 Empirical estimates of these 
potential losses are hard to come by, something which we consider in detail 
below. This section provides a conceptual overview of economic damage, as 
well as consumer value.  
3.1. Economic damage to agents and creators 
Existing economic analysis looking specifically at economic damage from 
consumer copyright exceptions is limited. As noted above, copyright 
exceptions include those for news reporting, research and education. Each of 
these raise different issues, hence any review of fair dealing or fair use rightly 
devotes time to them. Similarly, much economic analysis looks at various 
aspects of copyright together with fair dealing, often leading to a long and 
detailed treatment of the role of markets, transaction costs, transformative 
works and alike (see Boyer, 2007). Einhorn (2004, Chapter 2) looks solely at 
‘Fair Use, Markets and Economic Analysis’ and does discuss the notion of 
‘market harm’ (which is US copyright legislative term). Einhorn states ‘the 
market harm test is very subjective’ and ‘a defendant must prove that there is 
no market for either unit sales or use-licensing of a particular work’ (page 9). 
The remaining discussion then considers commercial cases where the 
defendant has tried to use the fair use defence. For our purposes this is not of 
direct relevance since we are dealing solely with the possible damage caused 
by consumers only. The importance of this is due to the fact that economists 
generally assume that consumers are – rather obviously – the final consumers 
of the products they buy. 
Another part of the existing literature considers the economics of copying (see 
Towse, 2008, for a review). This is of relevance, since a consumer format-
shifting can be considered copying. However, most of this literature is 
concerned with unauthorised, or illegal, copying or filesharing.  
10 In general it is important to distinguish between revenue and profits, since the latter is 
defined as revenue less costs. However, in the case of many copyrighted products the 
additional (or marginal) costs can be very low, hence changes in revenues and profits may be 
similar. 
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This is clearly a very important issue, but is not the focus here. Specifically, 
the main problem with ‘filesharing’ is that it implies sharing across different 
consumers, whereas legal format-shifting only involves one consumer. As we 
shall see this makes an important difference in the analysis. 
Consider the case of the sale of a new work, whether music, film, software or 
other creative work. The economic damage to creators or agents that own the 
copyright from an increase in copyright exceptions must come from:  
a) a reduction in revenue of the specific work, either now or in the future 
and, if this is positive,  
b) a ‘dynamic effect’ whereby the lost sales now affect the ability to 
generate new work in the future and thereby revenues in the future. 
It is clear that only if a) occurs that b) can have validity. Also, criterion a) is 
solely concerned with how current and future revenue is influenced by 
copyright exceptions. 
Some commentators define an additional type of ‘economic damage’ that 
relates to previous sales of copyrighted goods (e.g. Econlaw, 2007). The 
argument here is that improvements in technology (e.g. the iPod) allow 
consumers to gain more value from their existing purchases of music, films, 
etc. In our view, labelling this as ‘economic damage’ is a shift away from 
normal economic analysis and the normal functioning of markets. Whilst 
retrospective compensation is commonplace in the copyright system, for 
example with retrospective term extensions, the market system does not 
generally provide for retrospective compensation based on how technology 
has enabled new uses.11 Nevertheless, if it is agreed that the sale of a 
copyrighted product is fundamentally different from other products, this 
retrospective argument should be considered. Note, however, that the 
economic damage should relate to the loss of revenue in the past, and not the 
consumer value generated, since these are fundamentally different concepts 
(see below). 
 
11 One can think of many examples. The manufacturers of sofas do not claim a share of 
consumers’ increased value, on past sofa purchases, derived from plasma TVs. The 
manufacturers of cutlery do not claim a share of consumers’ increased value from 
microwavable dinners. Car manufacturers do not claim a share of consumers’ increased 
value from satellite navigation devices. 
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Some commentators also note that increasing copyright exceptions may not 
have only detrimental effects. For example, it is sometimes suggested that 
format-shifting may allow others to hear, see or play the work. This may, in 
turn, generate more revenue either now or in the future. Similarly, the wider 
exposure that format-shifting, parody or user-generated content creates may 
also increase sales. Increased sales can come from either primary sales of 
the work, or so-called secondary sales (such as tickets for live concerns, 
merchandise, etc).12 Lastly, a balanced view of improvements in technology 
must allow for the possibility that new technologies could increase current 
sales of creative work. 
3.2. Consumer value 
In general, when a consumer buys a CD, or any product, we assume they 
include in their valuation an estimate of the entire benefits derived from the 
CD. This includes listening to the CD now, next week and next year, as well 
as listening to it with friends and family, format-shifting (if legal) and benefits 
from new technologies in the future.  
At any point in time, any specific product will receive a wide range of 
‘valuations’, as consumers are heterogeneous. Economists summarise these 
valuations into a demand curve, as shown in Figure 1, for a specific product. 
The market price is determined by a variety of factors, including the 
competition in the market for the specific product (e.g. the price of similar 
music or software). The revenue accruing to the agent is shaded and a 
proportion of this will be forwarded to the creator. 
A key result of the standard analysis of demand is that the value of copyright 
exceptions will be embedded into a demand curve. Hence, there is an 
argument that agents and creators automatically extract value from copyright 
exceptions. Similarly, if the extent of copyright exceptions is changed then the 
demand curve will automatically shift to reflect these. It will shift outwards if 
copyright exceptions are increased (as consumers are assumed to gain, 
hence their valuations increase), and shift inwards if exceptions are reduced.  
12 Economists often refer to these effects as ‘sampling’ or ‘exposure’ (see Peitz and 
Waelbrock, 2004). 
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Figure 1 Demand curve 
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The basic idea that the initial purchase of copyrighted work will embody all the 
benefits is linked to, but is distinct from, the economic concept of ‘indirect 
appropriability’ with respect to intellectual property. In economic papers, such 
as Leibowitz (1985) and Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2004), there is an 
argument that the ‘first sale’ of a work (e.g. book, song, etc) can embody the 
entire subsequent flow of revenues from copying and re-selling that work. This 
is a much stronger argument, which can be used to argue against strong 
intellectual property rights. In short, the ‘first sale’ argument assumes that the 
initial buyer has a good ability to on-sell the work (hence the first sale price is 
high and generates a good return to agents and creators).  
In the case of copyright exceptions all that is being assumed is that the 
consumer understands the benefits they will gain from the purchase. It may be 
that some of these benefits are uncertain – will their family like the film, or how 
future technology will expand benefits – but we assume that the consumer is 
best placed to make these valuations. It may be posited that the prevalence of 
private copying in the UK, despite its illegality, suggests that consumers 
assume that paying the first sale price allows them to format-shift. 
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To explore these issues consider a specific case of extending copyright 
exceptions to include format-shifting. Further, let us consider only the music 
market. Such a change may reduce the purchases of new music, as 
previously some consumers purchased multiple copies of the same music to 
play on different formats (e.g. CD player and iPod). The extent of any possible 
reductions in purchases is contested, but an economic evaluation should 
impartially assess these. Any such reductions can be referred to as economic 
impact, or damage, on the rights-holder leading to a) and b) above, i.e. a 
reduction in revenue and subsequent reduction in incentive to generate new 
work. It is also important to be clear that the economic benefit to consumers of 
the potential change is not equal to the economic damage. In general, the 
economic benefit to consumers will be greater than the economic damage.  
To illustrate these issues consider the following thought experiment. Suppose 
there are 10,000 consumers of music who buy a recording per year. Let there 
be two formats and each recording costs £10 in either format. Currently, 
format shifting is prohibited hence a consumer has to buy two copies if they 
want to use both formats. This relatively high price of using both formats 
suggests relatively few consumers will buy an extra copy. Suppose only 100 
consumers buy two copies of a recording. If a format-shifting exception is 
introduced, a first assessment of the economic damage is the loss of 100 
sales (revenue loss = 100 x 10 = 1,000), although this needs further analysis. 
The gain to consumers is likely to be much more than this since many more 
will use format-shifting if there is a zero price. Let us assume 2,000 
consumers now use format-shifting. The total benefit to consumers is the 
overall benefit to these consumers. This must be greater than the economic 
damage, since the original 100 consumers no longer pay and a further 1,900 
customers now also benefit. Economists measure the overall benefit to 
consumers (consumer surplus) by the area under a demand curve. Figure 2 
illustrates the potential gain in consumer surplus in this numerical example. 
The demand curve in Figure 2 relates to format-shifting not the original 
purchases of the music. 
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 We could assume that the revenue loss to agents is 10 x 100 = 1,000, but this 
is only an approximation since it implicitly assumes that the demand for 
recordings stays constant. In fact, the 100 customers who previously bought 
two copies now have additional money to spend and may increase demand 
for recordings. More importantly, there are now 2,000 purchasers of music 
that gain additional value from every recording they buy, which may increase 
their purchases.  
The above thought experiment points to a number of key issues in assessing 
the impact of changes in copyright exceptions: 
• A change in copyright exceptions will generate consumer benefits in 
the ‘secondary market’ (e.g. the market for format-shifting, or back-
ups). The total benefits generated may be very large relative to any 
potential economic damage to agents and creators.  
• The overall economic damage to agents and creators (e.g. their loss in 
revenue) depends on how the demand for their work changes. Since 
increasing copyright exceptions may increase demand (and decreasing 
copyright exceptions may decrease demand), conceptually it is not 
clear whether economic damage will be caused at all. However, how 
demand changes in specific cases should be the subject of empirical 
study. 
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4. The existing knowledge base 
The existing knowledge base with regards to both existing and proposed 
consumer copyright exceptions is noticeably small. This is perhaps 
understandable given that many of the arguments against the expansion 
copyright exceptions, or against copyright exceptions without a compensation 
scheme, focus on either consumer value or on a legalistic conception of 
copyright limitation.13  
As an example of the lack of economic evidence, the 2008 EU Stakeholder 
consultation asked the followed the question: 
6) Are you aware of further economic studies on the topics discussed 
in the Document? 
Of the 95 respondents who replied in English, 68 did not complete this 
question or answered in the negative. Those that did respond tended to point 
to the same two studies: EconLaw (2007) and Nathan Associates (2006). 
These are reviewed below. No respondent to the UK-IPO 2008 The Way 
Ahead Issues Paper cited any study in their response to the first two 
questions. 
4.1. Format-shifting 
The economic evidence on format-shifting tends to be associated with what 
are often called ‘levy systems’ or ‘private copying remuneration’ (PCR). Two 
recent studies are widely cited as providing empirical analyses. 
The EconLaw study 
The Econlaw (2007) study sets out to analyse ‘the economic rationale and 
effects of the private copy remuneration (or PCR) system’. There is no specific 
reference in this statement to providing empirical evidence, but the report 
presents a large number of tables and charts, hence this can be inferred.  
13 MPA Response to 2006 EU Stakeholder Consultation on Copyright Levies – Available at: 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/copyright_neighbouring/s
takeholder_consultation/picture_association/_EN_1.0_&a=d 
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The reference to PCR implies that illegal copying is not part of the study.14 
The report focuses solely on the music industry, but claims that the 
conclusions are ‘applicable to a significant extent’ to all intellectual property 
rightsprotected works. (page 3) 
Of particular interest here is any empirical evidence on the extent of economic 
damage to creators caused by copyright exceptions. An initial statement in the 
study is as follows: 
This private copying exception substantially increases consumers’ 
freedom to use intellectual property rights protected goods. 
Nonetheless, this non-consented use of intellectual property rights 
protected works cannot remain uncompensated. (Econlaw, 2007, p.6) 
This assumes that value is created and that the copyright (or intellectual 
property rights) holders must be compensated. As discussed in Section 3, this 
has the potential to confuse the value to consumers with economic damage. 
The Econlaw study develops this argument by stating: 
The private copying exception is a legal instrument that generates 
increased consumer value. This limit on the exclusivity of intellectual 
property rights increases consumers’ freedom of use of the intellectual 
works. From an economic perspective, this increased freedom 
automatically translates into a higher valuation of the intellectual 
property rights protected goods – which gets expanded whenever 
technological or other developments allow new potential uses of the 
intellectual property rights protected goods. (Econlaw, 2007, page 7) 
This again focuses on consumer value, not economic damage, but also 
introduces the idea that technological developments may increase the value 
of existing intellectual property rights protected goods. Again as discussed in 
Section 3, the argument that any such increased value should automatically 
generate a payment is non-standard. The claim that copyright owners should 
benefit from technological developments is made clear at a number of points 
in the Econlaw study. Specifically they state: 
14 This is made clearer on p.30 of the study where it states ‘[even if] the reduction of music 
industry revenues cannot be fully attributed to the intensification of private copying in the 
digital environment (but also to illegal copying or piracy) and, therefore, PCR collection should 
be lower than the reduction in music revenues’. 
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‘In sum, the digital environment justifies an enlargement of the PCR system’. 
(page 7) 
The Econlaw study consistently assumes that any increased value to the 
consumer implies compensation to the copyright owner. For example, it 
states: 
‘If the private copying exception was not accompanied by the 
corresponding PCR, users of intellectual property rights goods would 
be unfairly profiting at the expense of creators, who would be 
expropriated in the same proportion’. (page 21) 
This not only assumes that the benefits of consumers is proportional to the 
losses of the creators, but also implies that consumers are ‘unfairly profiting’. 
It is important to recall that the discussion here concerns a private copying 
exception, not illegal copying, hence this is non-standard to say consumers 
are unfairly profiting.15  
The Econlaw study has an extensive discussion of the decrease in revenues 
to the music industry in many major economies over the 2002 to 2005. They 
find that in Western Europe music revenues declined by 17% over this period 
(or €2bn). They also devote much attention to describing the rapid growth in 
the consumer electronics industry over the same period. The relevance of this 
is that they claim consumer electronic devices and copyrighted material are 
(economic) complements.16  
The Econlaw study does make a statement relating to economic damage on 
page 30. This says: 
Given that PCR’s aim is to compensate right-holders for the reduction 
in revenues derived from private copying activities, a properly 
functioning PCR system ought to compensate for most of these losses 
of the music industry. (page 30) 
15 For example, if someone buys a newspaper for £1, and manage to get £20 of ‘value’ or 
‘benefit’ from it, we do not normally say they unfairly profited, since the ‘unfairness’ implied by 
such transactions in a market economy is to be expected and ‘profits’ implies the consumer is 
a firm. 
16 Economic complements are defined as the case when the demand for both goods is 
positively linked. A classic example is burgers and ‘burger buns’. It implies when the price of 
one declines, the demand for the other increases.  
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Although it is not entirely clear what ‘these losses’ refers to, the subsequent 
paragraphs imply that the reduction in sales of €2bn (2002 to 2005) is the 
amount lost. Hence the report assumes that the economic damage from 
private copying activities equals the fall in music sales.  
The study does mention that other factors could have caused some of the 
reductions – they mention illegal activity, regulatory, legislative and 
evolutionary factors – but there is no attempt to quantify these. They then note 
that the increase in PCRs over 2002 to 2005 was 4% of the lost revenues. 
The major limitations with the Econlaw study are: 
1) It assumes that the amount of compensation to creators should be 
proportional to the consumer value generated. This is simplistic. A 
more formal economic analysis of the changes in demand for creative 
work is required in order to ascertain ‘compensation’ or ‘economic 
damage’. 
2) The study contains no formal economic analysis regarding changes in 
demand. The study simply assumes that the reduction in music sales 
over the 2002 to 2005 period is caused by private copying activities. 
3) In a comparative section (6.1-6.4, pp. 55-71), the report compares the 
current PCR system with some alternatives on the fulfilment of four 
criteria: 
 
a) That remuneration should be a function of social value of works. 
b) Costs of the system should be minimised. 
c) Who copies more pays more. 
d) Spillovers on the economy should be minimised. 
In is not clear however that the PCR system meets the criteria set down by 
the Econlaw study.  
a) As discussed in Section 3.2, the value of private copying is 
embedded in the demand for copyrighted work so a levy on consumer 
electronics is not necessary to equate price with demand.  
b) It is incorrect to say, as the report does, that ‘the purchase of the 
devices and/or carriers subject to PCR triggers the payment of a 
certain amount. The rule is easy to apply and generates few 
information and transaction costs.’ (page 56). Copyright levies generate 
a significant deadweight loss in the transaction and administration 
costs associated with collecting societies, copyright tribunals and the 
like.  
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In addition if, as the report seems to support, the law is made more 
complex to differentiate levy levels by device or storage capacity these 
costs will only increase.17   
c) It is not clear that there is a strong enough connection between the 
amount of storage on devices that allow for repeated copying and the 
incidence of copying to support a statement such as ‘The PCR system 
also complies with the principle that who copies more pays more’ (page 
57). A consumer with a 1GB MP3 player may fill it with different set of 
music each week, while a consumer with a 40GB device may fill it up 
once only.  
d) The spillovers from levies are significant in effect on both the 
intellectual property rights and consumer electronics (CE) industries 
(see following discussion of Nathan Associates study). They are also 
not minimised given the irrelevance of levies in securing criterion a).  
Nathan Associates study 
The Nathan Associates Study considers the effects of levies in the market for 
consumer electronic devices (e.g. MP3 players, mobile phones, PCs) and 
blank media (e.g. blank CDs, DVDs, flash memory). Although this is not 
directly related to the issue of damage to rights-holders, it is important in 
understanding the impacts of levies. 
When a levy (or tax) is imposed, the price in that market rises, and hence the 
quantity sold falls. These changes imply that a) consumers are made worse 
off and b) the producers of electronic devices lose profits. The Nathan 
Associates study analyses what would happen to prices and quantities (of 
consumer products) if levies were removed. In order to do this one needs to 
be able to quantify how the quantity sold responds to a fall in prices. 
Economists use the concept of ‘price elasticity of demand’ to quantify such 
responses.18 The study provides a table specifying the elasticities used in 
their study (their Table 5). Since the elasticities used can dramatically change 
the outcomes of their study it is better that these come from formal economic 
studies. They use elasticity data from three different sources, only one of 
which is an academic article, although this is unpublished (Brynjolfsson, 
1994). 
17 Towse (2008)  
18 The price elasticity of demand is the percentage change in demand for a one percent 
change in price. Hence it is simply a measure of responsiveness, although expressed in 
percent. 
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The report presents a case study for sales of MP3 players in France. It finds 
that the French levy system reduces sales of MP3 players by 11.7%. They 
perform similar analysis on effects of levy system on market for online music 
and ringtones. This shows a fall in MP3 sales by 11.7% would result in €217 
million of lost online music sales in Western Europe and America. This is 
based on the idea that music and consumer electronic devices are 
complements (something also noted in the Econlaw study). They also find that 
a fall in mobile phone sales by 3.7% (caused by levies) would result in €30 
million of lost ringtone sales in Western Europe and America.  
The calculations for changes in prices and quantities can then be used to 
perform a series of (relatively) standard consumer and producer surplus 
analyses on the effect of the levy system. For France, they estimate that the 
levy system on MP3 players imposes a ‘cost’ of €155.9 million (the implication 
is that this is each year).  
The major limitations with the Nathan Associations study are: 
1) The majority of demand elasticities that they use do not come from 
formal economic analysis. While this may be due to unavailability of 
such studies, especially for new consumer goods, it may introduce 
bias. 
2) The report does not make clear that the ‘losses to consumers and 
producers’ are not the same as ‘losses to society as a whole’. Part of 
the losses to consumers are a gain to creators (i.e. the levy transfers 
money from consumers to creators). From an economic viewpoint this 
is a net transfer and not a loss to society. Similarly, they report the 
losses to the producers of electronic devices without comment. From a 
wider societal perspective, as consumer electronics firms produce less, 
more resources are available to other producers. Hence, the losses to 
producers of consumer electronics are much greater than the losses to 
society. These two issues are likely to cause a substantial overestimate 
of the economic damage caused.  
Other economic evidence on levies 
These two studies discussed above are the most highly cited recent reports. 
There appear to be no journal publications that focus on levies and economic 
damage. While one might expect some economic evidence to have been 
accumulated by authorities in countries that impose levies, this appears to be 
confidential or unavailable.  
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To be clear, there are a great many ‘statements’ on the issue of the role of 
levies, and some of these may include ‘numbers’, but these are not 
considered economic analysis or evidence. For example, there were many 
responses to the EU 2006, EU 2008 and UK 2008 consultations, and some of 
these expressed opinions about, and some data related, to the role of levies. 
However, from our reading of these responses there are no serious attempts 
to quantify economic damage. 
In our investigations into the levy systems in other countries, we contacted 
experts in intellectual property law including Rufus Pollock (UK), Kimberlee 
Weatherall19 (Australia) and Jeremy de Beer20 (Canada). They were able to 
provide us some useful information21,22,23,24 into the levy regimes in their 
countries, but also confirmed our belief that levies worldwide are set mostly 
without any reference to economic analysis of harm or damage.  
In addition, we investigated the websites of a number of European collecting 
societies. Representative are those of the Finnish collection agency 
(Hyvitysmaksu25) and the Dutch collection society (Stichting de Thuiskopie26). 
Hyvitysmaksu provides a link to the Econlaw study, statistics showing the 
volume of imported products subject to PCR, and another short piece of 
research detailing the prevalence of copying onto mobile phones. Stichting de 
Thuiskopie provides only an international survey27 of the levels of various 
European country levies. Neither of these two, nor any others we investigated, 
gave URL links to, or provided directly, any data concerning economic 
damage. 
To be clear, there are various papers related to levies which provide data and 
numbers such as CLRA (2006), which states that between 2001 and 2006, 
levy revenue increased from €11 million to €73 million, whilst over the same 
period, private copying fell by 30% (video) and 40% (music). However, our 
assessment is that none of these papers address the highly specific issue of 
economic damage to rights-holders caused by current or proposed consumer 
format-shifting copyright exceptions, nor to do they contain data that can be 
used for that purpose. Based on this, we are forced to conclude that no such 
assessment exists. 
19 http://weatherall.blogspot.com/ 
20 http://www.jeremydebeer.ca/ 
21 Weatherall (2005) 
22 Australian Copyright Council (2001) 
23 Australian Mechanical Copyright Owners Society & Screenrights (2001) 
24 Copyright Board of Canada (1999) 
25 http://www.hyvitysmaksu.fi/fin/index_en.html 
26 http://www.thuiskopie.nl/nl?port=1053522455227455044  
27 http://bit.ly/ZlSYb5 
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4.2. Parody 
The economic issues surrounding parody, as related to consumer copyright 
exceptions, are similar to those discussed in Section 3. Economic damage is 
caused if parody influences the demand curve for the rights-holder’s work. In 
general, the existence of more parody could both decrease demand (e.g. by 
influencing consumers’ views on the value of the original work) or increase 
demand (e.g. by increasing the awareness of consumers to the original work 
and hence acting as ‘advertising’). The consumer benefits from parody can be 
thought of as being embodied in a ‘demand curve for parody’. The total value 
of consumers’ benefits (or consumer surplus) from parody may be very large 
and, in general, this will have no direct association with the possible economic 
damage. 
Although the economic issues are sometimes discussed in the literature, there 
seems to be an absence of any economic evidence on the above effects. It 
also seems to be the case that this proposed exception is less controversial in 
the industry than format-shifting. None of the responses to the 2008 EU 
Stakeholder Consultation on Copyright Levies made any reference to parody. 
In the summary of responses to the 2008 UK-IPO consultation, ‘Taking 
Forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: Proposed Changes to 
Copyright Exceptions’ the report notes that approximately half of the 63 
respondents who commented on the proposed exception for parody objected 
to it, citing potential financial and reputational damage to creators and rights-
holders. However, none of these responses were available so it is not 
possible to assess whether any economic assessment on the extent of any 
economic damage has in fact taken place. Though it seems unlikely given the 
general dearth of economic analysis relating to other areas of copyright.      
4.3. User-generated content  
There is a large amount of literature on the economic, social and legal 
consequences of the recent growth in user-generated content. To generalise, 
the majority of the literature focuses on the vast amount of potential economic 
value that is embodied within, or could be harnessed from, user-generated 
content. For an interesting discussion of the importance of the vast creativity 
possible from the open source software and mash-up music scenes see 
Lessig (2008, especially pp. 76-83). Boyle (2008) also deals with this issue 
which he terms ‘failed sharing’ – sharing that never takes place because the 
law prevents it. What is problematic from the point of view of this review is that 
the literature mostly takes for granted that the creation of user-generated 
content is synonymous with its distribution via internet tools such as 
Youtube.com or Flickr.com.  
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Gowers’ Recommendation 11 is more modest in that it proposes that 
derivative or transformative works be excepted on the basis that they conform 
to the Berne Three-Step Test28, which would exclude any commercial use, 
including posting on a website that generates advertising revenue. This point 
is reiterated in The Way Ahead (page 49) report which imagines what a 
personal, non-commercial copyright exception might look like: 
What might a personal, non-commercial use exception cover? 
The scope would be decided in Europe; possibilities include: 
 
- creating mash-ups of sound and/or images for personal use, 
such as sampled music or putting a sound-track to family 
photos; 
- format-shifting from CDs to MP3 on computer, phone or player 
- sharing mash-ups and photos with friends and family 
 
Commercial use not covered by the exception might include a 
DJ playing his or her mashed up tunes in the course of paid 
employment or someone obtaining advertising revenue through 
putting works on the web. ‘Personal use’ implies that public 
performance or extensive sharing of works would fall outside the 
exception, as would use by third sector organisations or 
businesses.    
 
In this definitional clarification of scope, the economic aspects of non-
commercial user-generated content are much like those of format-shifting and 
parody. If user-generated content negatively influences the demand curve for 
the rights-holder’s work, by acting as a substitute good or via reputational 
effects, economic damage occurs. No evidence was brought forward in any of 
the EU or UK consultations to suggest that this effect is real or significant, 
neither do any academic articles seem to address this issue.  
28 The Berne Three-Step Test outlines the maximum extent of exceptions to copyright. Under 
Article 13 of TRIPS, signatories such as the UK agree to ‘confine limitations or exceptions to 
exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with the normal exploitation of 
the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights-holder’. 
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5. Gap analysis 
With regards to evidence of the economic effects of consumer copyright 
exceptions, there are not so much gaps in the literature as a complete void. 
This said, there are a number of basic comments about the literature: 
1) In the case of economic damage caused by consumer-related 
copyright exceptions, economic theory suggests that the benefit 
consumers derive from any copyright exceptions will be incorporated 
automatically into the demand for the original creative work.  
Consumers will recognise that buying the original entitles them to use 
the product in various ways and hence their demand decision will 
reflect this. This is the best starting point for any economic analysis. It 
indicates that extending copyright exceptions may well increase 
demand for creative work. The implications of this are quite subtle. For 
example, if consumers already (wrongly) believe that they have the 
right to format-shift, the value they gain from this is already embedded 
in the demand for the original product. Altering the law to allow format-
shifting will, therefore, have little effect. However, the fact that copyright 
exceptions are, in the above sense, already reflected in the demand for 
creative work does not mean there can be no economic damage (i.e. 
lost sales). For example in the case of format-shifting, when this is 
prohibited some consumers may buy multiple copies. When format-
shifting is made legal these consumers do not buy multiple copies. 
However, legal format-shifting will cause many other consumers to 
increase their demand for creative work. The overall outcome in terms 
of sales depends on the net result of these two factors. More formally, 
changes in copyright exceptions will tend to alter the position and 
elasticity of the demand curve for original creative work. Conceptually, 
there is no reason to think this should cause economic damage. 
 
2) The previous point suggests a need to understand the demand for 
creative work. While there is some analysis of demand elasticities, the 
economic analysis of this seems to be pitifully low. Understanding the 
economic effects – including possible economic damage – must be 
based on such analysis. Without this, any empirical ‘evidence’ is likely 
to be highly speculative, as indicated by the Econlaw (2007) study. 
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6. Conclusions 
This review has examined the existing literature on the possible economic 
effects of changes to consumer copyright exceptions. The specific interest is 
whether the proposed changes in Gowers (2006) would cause economic 
damage to rights-holders. This review does not consider the economic issues 
surrounding commercial copyright infringement via file-sharing and 
commercial ‘mash-ups’.  
This review has attempted to assess the current evidence that format-shifting, 
parodies and user-generated content causes economic damage to rights-
holders via lost sales from substitution effects (or in the case of parody via lost 
sales from substitution and reputational effects). We have failed to find any 
evidence to that effect. The two studies that we reviewed in depth, Econlaw 
(2007) and Nathan Associates (2006) only indirectly address this specific 
issue and do not constitute evidence of economic damage to rights-holders 
from the proposed consumer copyright exceptions.  
Many countries have now introduced a levy on blank media and digital 
storage hardware. The main stated rationale behind this is to provide ‘fair 
compensation’29 to rights-holders for the activities of consumers. We are 
unable to find any evidence of economic analyses of damage to rights-holders 
being used to set the level of ‘fair compensation’ by bodies such as copyright 
tribunals (which set the levels of copyright levies) or collecting societies (which 
administer their collection and distribution). 
As our discussion of economic damage and consumer value makes clear, 
these are separate concepts. It is not appropriate to claim that increased 
consumer value derived from the interaction of copyrighted works and new 
technology is damaging either to artists now, or decreases their incentive to 
supply creative works. Basic economic concepts suggest that copyright 
exceptions lead to an increase in consumer value which is significantly greater 
than the economic damage to rights-holders in the case of format-shifting.  
29 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society – 
Official Journal L 167, 22/06/2001 P.0010 – 0019. Recital (35) states that: ‘In certain cases of 
exceptions or limitations, right-holders should receive fair compensation to compensate 
them adequately for the use made of their protected works or other subject-matter. When 
determining the form, detailed arrangements and possible level of such fair 
compensation, account should be taken of the particular circumstances of each case’. 
Emphasis added. 
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Finally, it is clear that there is a gaping void in the current literature on the 
economic damage caused by consumer copyright exceptions. Until such time 
as new evidence is produced concerning any of the possible effects 
mentioned in this review, our view is that the introduction of the three new 
consumer exceptions proposed by Gowers would cause a) little or no damage 
to rights-holders and hence would not alter incentives create and b) 
substantial would result in consumers deriving increased economic value from 
copyrighted works.  
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